











































Provincial official turnover and bank loans
Citation for published version:
Cao, C, Dong, Y, Hou, W, Liu, Y & Qian, X 2019, 'Provincial official turnover and bank loans', Pacific-Basin
Finance Journal, vol. 57, 101202. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pacfin.2019.101202
Digital Object Identifier (DOI):
10.1016/j.pacfin.2019.101202
Link:






Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 23. Jul. 2021
1 
 
    






Based on the turnover data of provincial party committee secretaries in China between 2000 
and 2008, we find that the loan increment of local SOEs (state-owned enterprises) decreases 
by 18.9% in turnover years. We also document increased efficiency of long-term loans in 
turnover years. The effects of provincial leader turnover on bank loans only exist for local 
SOEs in eastern regions and more marketized provinces. Local officials have less of a political 
incentive to exert influence on bank credit allocation in turnover years, and therefore banks act 
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The impact of political intervention on economic outcomes is an important issue in the 
political economy literature. This vast literature mainly focuses on how political leadership 
elections affect corporate investments. A number of studies show that firms significantly reduce 
investment expenditure during periods of high political uncertainty, such as election years, 
supporting the notion that political uncertainty hinders corporate investments (e.g. Julio and 
Yook, 2012; An et al., 2016; Jens, 2017). While financial activities play a crucial role in 
economic growth and corporate investments, political influence on the allocation of financial 
resources (e.g. bank loans) during a power reshuffle has been much less well studied, in 
comparison to political influence on corporate investments. In particular, the impact of regional 
political leader turnover, in countries in which there are no elections, on bank loan allocation 
is largely unexplored.  
Several studies (e.g. Dinc, 2005) show that bank lending increases significantly during 
election years, as predicted by the political business cycle hypothesis (Nordhaus, 1975) that 
incumbents manipulate policies to increase growth prior to an election in order to gain more 
votes in the election. The results are not yet conclusive. First, it is not clear whether results 
from countries with democratic elections are generalizable to countries with different political 
regimes (e.g. non-election political reshuffle). The effect may depend on a country’s political 
structure. Second, prior studies mainly focus on the change in bank loans, while the impact of 
political turnover on the efficiency of bank loans remains under-researched. Finally, the main 
channels through which officials influence banks loans are not well studied in the literature. 
Aiming to provide new insights to these questions, we examine the impact of Chinese 
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provincial leader turnover on the efficiency of bank loan allocation.  
Different from most Western countries, on which most studies are based, China has several 
unique features in its economic structure and political system, which provide an interesting 
setting to study the effects of regional political turnover on bank loans. First, state-owned banks 
dominate the Chinese banking sector (Dobson and Kashyab, 2006), which could facilitate 
political intervention in banking activities. We expect that the problems associated with 
political influence on bank loans could be more severe than those on the corporate investments 
of non-bank firms, as the political motivations behind bank loans could be easily disguised by 
the information asymmetry between banks and outsiders over the quality of loans (Dinc, 2005). 
Second, firms, especially SOEs, rely heavily on bank loans (Cull and Xu, 2000; Firth et al., 
200), due to the relatively nascent stock markets and small corporate bond markets. Therefore, 
bank credit allocation is the most important channel through which politicians could influence 
investments in SOEs. Third, administrative, fiscal and banking decentralisation (Jin et al., 2005) 
empowers local (e.g. provincial) officials with substantial autonomy and effective tools to 
utilise in intervening into the economic activities of both banks and firms, especially 
provincially controlled SOEs. In particular, the region-based banking system that emerged after 
banking decentralisation could be abused by local officials engaging in political or personal 
rent-seeking behaviour. Finally, the tournament-like regional (e.g. provincial) performance-
based personnel evaluation and promotion schemes (Maskin et al., 2000) in the Chinese 
political regime create strong incentives for local officials to intervene in bank lending 
activities or corporate investments, in favour of their own political or personal agenda. 
Using hand-collected data on changes of provincial party secretaries in China between 
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2000 and 2008, we conduct regression analyses to examine the relation between regional 
political turnover and the change in the level and efficiency of bank loans in local SOEs. In our 
analyses, we also distinguish different geographic locations, different types of firms (i.e. 
centrally controlled SOEs, provincially controlled SOEs and private firms), and direct/indirect 
controls. Furthermore, we conduct several robustness checks, including an endogeneity test 
employing the instrumental variable approach, and additional analysis using the difference-in-
differences method. 
We report a significant decrease in the bank loans of local SOEs during provincial party 
secretary turnover years. The magnitude of this effect in economic terms is dramatic, 
considering that the loan increment falls by 18.9% in turnover years, on average, relative to 
non-turnover years, and such decrease is mainly due to the reduction in long-term loans. Our 
results also show that the efficiency of long-term loan allocation is significantly higher in 
turnover years than in non-turnover years, suggesting that banks act as more effective financial 
intermediaries in credit allocation in turnover years. Additionally, we find that effects of local 
political turnover on bank loans only exist in local SOEs in eastern regions.  
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to examine the effects of regional 
political turnover on the allocation of bank loans. In contrast to existing studies that report an 
increase in bank lending during election years in countries with democratic election systems 
(Dinc, 2005), our study documents a significant decrease in bank loans in provincial political 
leader turnover years in China.  
Another contribution of this study is providing empirical evidence on how regional 
political turnovers affect the efficiency of bank loan allocation, while the existing literature has 
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focused on the influence of political turnovers on the level of loans only (e.g. Dinc, 2005). Our 
study also helps to identify the bank channel as the dominant channel through which turnover 
could affect the efficiency of bank loan allocation. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides the institutional 
background. Section 3 discusses related literature and develops the hypotheses. Section 4 
describes the sample and research design. Section 5 presents empirical results. Section 6 
concludes. 
 
2. Decentralisation in China  
During the First Five-Year Plan (1953-1957), based on the Soviet model, China gradually 
realized the limitations of over-centralisation featured in the Soviet model and started to deviate 
from the model through administrative decentralization. As a result, China has had a multi-
layer-multi-regional hierarchical economy following the territorial principle (M-form) since 
1958. Political power has been further decentralised along regional lines through a series of 
reforms which enhance the authority of provincial governments. 
Following the successful decentralisation in the political system, several reforms since 
1979 extended the decentralisation to the financial system. In 1980, the Chinese government 
introduced the fiscal revenue sharing scheme, in which provinces remit a portion of local 
revenue to the central government and retain the remainder. The fiscal sharing scheme largely 
increased local governments’ incentives to boost local economic growth (Jin et al., 2005). The 
separation of the central bank and the big four specialised banks in 1983 marked the beginning 
of the decentralisation in China’s banking system. In particular, .the regional deposits are 
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connected to the credit expansion of the regional branches of specialised banks. Each regional 
branch of the central bank is responsible for the reallocation of funds within each region. In 
addition, regional banks owned by local government have been established since 1980s. This 
region-based banking system makes it possible for local governments to exert their influence 
on credit allocation through the regional branches of the specialised banks and the central bank.  
 
3. Literature review and hypotheses development  
3.1 Allocation of bank loans  
Since North (1981), the vast literature has investigated government intervention and 
political influence on economic performance and demonstrated that political institutions have 
an important impact on economic growth across countries (e.g. Shleifer and Vishny, 1993; 
Limongi and Przeworski, 1993; De Long and Shleifer, 1993; Quinn and Woolley, 2001; Rodrik 
et al., 2004, Chen, et al., 2017). Political leaders who play important roles in political 
institutions can significantly influence economic development and firms’ performance (Jones 
and Olken, 2004). On the one hand, the “helping hand” view of the government intervention 
suggests that government can promote economic development by intervening financial markets 
and channelling credits to the sectors prioritized by the governments and help politically 
connected firms to gain a number of benefits, including easier access to debt financing, 
favourite tax treatment etc. (Beck&Levine, 2002; La Porta et al. 2002; Sapienza, 2004; 
Charumilind et al., 2006; Faccio,2007). On the other hand, many research advance the 
opposing view that the government acts as a “grabbing hand,” controlled by politicians who 
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“do not maximize social welfare and instead pursue their own selfish objectives” (Shleifer and 
Vishny 1998, 4). Politicians in power exert political pressure to engage in rent-seeking 
behaviours, which in turn jeopardize firm performance and value (Frye and Shleifer, 1997; 
Faccio 2006; Ang et al. 2011; Carl et al. 2017). The government officials and bureaucrats’ 
intervention could be more pronounced in China, given the Chinese M-form hierarchical 
economy based on a territorial principle. The decentralised structure of the economy provides 
substantial autonomy and incentives for regional governments and local officials to develop 
their own region’s economies. Since the opening up of the Chinese economy to the outside 
world in 1979, China has shifted its focus of personnel evaluation criteria away from political 
conformity to economic performance (Chen et al., 2005). The central government rewards and 
punishes local officials through a yardstick competition on the basis of regional economic 
performance (Maskin et al., 2000). Such a performance-based promotion system creates 
tournament-like incentives for local government officials to advance local economic growth 
(Li and Zhou, 2005). One important way for local officials to boost economic growth is to 
influence the allocation of financial resources in their regions. Local officials can exert their 
influence through two channels.  
First, given the underdeveloped capital market and lack of a public bond market, bank 
loans are the dominant source of corporate investment, and loan credit supply plays a vital role 
in Chinese economic development (Cull and Xu, 2000; Firth et al., 2009). In this context, the 
two salient characteristics of the Chinese banking sector, state ownership and implicit 
government guarantees, allow local leaders to continuously exert influence over bank credit 
allocation. The Chinese banking sector is dominated by government-controlled banks, and the 
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board of directors and managers of those banks are generally appointed or approved by the 
governments (Bailey et al., 2012). This state ownership and the personal control in banks 
enable local officials to exploit financial resources and pressure banks to grant more loans to 
SOEs controlled by provincial governments in order to pursue their political or personal 
objectives. These firms play an important role in the regional economy, which in turn 
determines the career outcomes of provincial leaders. From the point of view of banks, Chinese 
SOEs bear relatively lower credit risk than non-state firms because of the implicit government 
guarantees. The government provides SOEs with subsidies or bailouts. Consequently, under 
the influence of local officials, banks incline to make more loans to SOEs and the lending 
decisions may not be made on a profit-maximization basis but largely according to political 
considerations. Therefore, local officials could intervene in economic activities through the 
bank channel to extract political benefits.  
Second, local officials could also influence credit allocation activities indirectly through 
the firm channel. As shown in the literature (e.g. Li and Zhou, 2005), local leaders play an 
active role in boosting regional economic growth through encouraging corporate investments. 
Cull et al. (2015) attribute the incentives of local officials to intervene in corporate investments 
to the fiscal revenue-sharing regime and performance-based promotion scheme in Chinese 
economic and political systems. Both the financial and the career-related benefits motivate 
local officials to encourage or even pressure firms to increase their investments, which could 
lead to a significant increase in the demand for bank loans. In this sense, local officials have a 
significant influence on the demand for bank loans, affecting the credit market indirectly. 
In brief, under normal conditions, the fiscal decentralisation and the tournament-style 
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promotion system could motivate local officials to lend a “helping hand” (Brown et al., 2009; 
Li, 1998) in pushing forward local GDP growth by channelling financial recourses such as bank 
credits to local SOEs (Jin et al., 2005; Li and Zhou, 2005) through their influence on the supply 
side (i.e. banks) and/or the demand side (i.e. corporate investments). In this paper, we examine 
the political influence of local officials on bank loans under an “abnormal” condition, that of 
provincial leader turnover periods.  
 
3.2 Hypothesis Development: Loans 
 
We hypothesize that the political influence on bank loans is weaker during provincial 
leader turnover than during a “normal” (non-turnover) period. This is because both the 
motivation of the incumbent leader and the ability of the new leader to exert influence on credit 
allocation are relatively weak during a turnover year. For the incumbent provincial leader, the 
career-related incentive to improve local economic performance by increasing capital 
expenditure is much weaker during the turnover, as his/her destination has already been decided 
by the time the turnover is announced. For the new leader, there is a transitional period for 
him/her to adapt to the new environment, before he/she could intervene in credit allocation 
from the supply side (through the bank channel) and/or from the demand side (through the firm 
channel). In other words, during provincial leader turnover, there is a short “power vacuum” 
period in which banks and local SOEs could be relieved temporarily of the political pressure 




Hypothesis 1a: The loan increment of local SOEs in provincial party secretary turnover years  
            is lower than that in non-provincial party secretary turnover years. 
 
Furthermore, we hypothesize that the impact of provincial leader turnover is more 
pronounced on long-term loans, considering that corporate investment projects subject to 
political influence often feature large capital expenditure that relies heavily on long-term loans. 
In addition, as pointed out by Diamond (1991) and Ramakrishnan and Thakor (1984), long-
term loans are usually more difficult to monitor than short-term loans, due to the difficulty 
banks face in accessing and assessing information related to long-term loans in a timely manner. 
In this sense, from banks’ perspective, long-term loans are riskier than short-term loans, and 
therefore banks are more likely to reduce long-term lending in order to effectively control risks 
during periods of provincial leader turnover. This leads to our prediction as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 1b: The long-term loan increment of local SOEs in provincial party secretary  
            turnover years is lower than that in non-provincial party secretary turnover years. 
   
3.3 Hypothesis Development: Credit allocation efficiency 
 
In the previous section, we suggested that the reduction in loans could be due to the 
adjustment on the supply side (i.e. banks) through the bank channel, the adjustment on the 
demand side (i.e. corporate investments) through the firm channel, or both. While both the 
supply-side adjustment and the demand-side adjustment during political turnover could 
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potentially affect loan increments in the same direction (i.e. decreasing loan increments), their 
impact on the efficiency of loan allocation could differ.  
Considering the bank channel, we hypothesize that banks could allocate credit more 
effectively during political turnover as they are subject to less political influence, and bank 
lending could increase firm value. Usually, the intermediary role of Chinese banks in 
optimising credit allocation is compromised due to political pressure. A large share of banks’ 
credit goes to loss-making SOEs (Cull and Xu, 2003). Policy loans and easy credit enable loss-
making SOEs to operate with “soft budget constraints” (Kornai, 1992). It seems Chinese banks 
are not too concerned about the risks associated with loans to loss-making SOEs that are 
granted under local government interventions, as bailouts from the government are usually 
assumed if banks fail. Thus, banks may deviate from a profit-maximisation objective to 
political or personal objectives set by bureaucrats or politicians based on the priorities of the 
government or the preferences of the politicians, consequently compromising the efficiency of 
loan allocation (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994; Sapienza, 2004). Indeed, considering the financial 
benefits and career concerns, local politicians (e.g. provincial leaders) have strong incentives 
to utilise the financial resources (e.g. bank credits) under their influence to help keep loss-
making SOEs afloat in order to avoid an increase in the unemployment rate and maintain social 
stability (Bailey et al., 2012) during their tenure. 
As political influence could have a negative impact on credit allocation efficiency, the 
decreased political intervention from provincial leaders during turnover periods is 
hypothesized to lead to an increase in credit allocation efficiency. Under less political pressure, 
banks have more autonomy in the allocation of financial resources, and they are more likely to 
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make lending decisions on a profit-maximization basis. As a result, high-quality loans will 
crowd out some “policy” loans, leading to an improvement in marginal productivity of capital 
(Beck et al., 2000). Furthermore, banks could play a more effective corporate governance role 
in monitoring investments, as proposed by Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Diamond (1984), 
when there is less political intervention. In brief, in provincial leader turnover years, banks are 
more likely to act as effective intermediaries in allocating loans to high-quality investment 
projects in local SOEs, thus increasing loan efficiency and improving firm performance. As 
discussed in the previous section, political influence is hypothesized to be more pronounced 
for long-term loans than short-term loans, and therefore we focus on long-term loans in 
examining the impact of political turnover on credit allocation efficiency. We use the marginal 
effect of long-term loans on local SOEs’ Tobin’s Q increment (i.e. marginal productivity of 
long-term loans) as the proxy for credit allocation efficiency in this study. Therefore, we 
develop our second hypothesis as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 2:  In provincial party secretary turnover years, the higher the long-term loan  
             increment, the higher Tobin’s Q increment, in local SOEs. 
 
It should be noted that apart from the supply-side adjustment made by banks (i.e. bank 
channel), the demand-side adjustment in corporate investments made by firms (i.e. firm 
channel) during turnover periods could also affect bank credit allocation efficiency. A vast 
literature shows that Chinese local governments’ intervention significantly influences corporate 
investment policies, and many local SOEs suffer from an overinvestment problem due to such 
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local political intervention. During turnover periods, the political incentive for local officials 
to encourage overinvestment is weak. Therefore, under less political pressure, local SOEs could 
alleviate the overinvestment problem and increase efficiency by cutting back on inefficient 
investments, leading to a decline in the demand for long-term loans from banks. As this 
adjustment is likely to be mainly on a value-maximisation basis, we expect that the higher the 
scale of such adjustment (i.e. lower long-term loan increment), the greater the improvement in 
efficiency (i.e. higher Tobin’s Q) in local SOEs. Interestingly, this firm channel-based 
prediction is the opposite of the bank channel-based prediction stated in our second hypothesis. 
It is possible that political turnover impacts bank loans through both channels simultaneously, 
and then these contradictory predictions provide us with a unique opportunity to empirically 
examine which effect from which channel dominates (i.e. the net effect of both bank and firm 
channels). 
 
4 Research design 
4.1. Data 
We obtain firm characteristic data from Chinese Stock Market Accounting Research 
(CSMAR) and annual reports for the period from 2000 to 2008. Starting with all Chinese A-
stock firms in the sample period, we exclude financial firms and firms without information 
about ultimate controlling shareholders. These screening criteria yield a final sample of 5,482 
local state-owned firm-year observations. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% 
and 99% levels.  
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The main independent variable of interest in our study is the turnover of provincial party 
general secretaries (Turnover). We focus on provincial party secretaries, considering their 
dominant power in the decision-making process at the provincial level and the large magnitude 
of their influence on both banking activities and corporate investments in their provinces. The 
provincial party secretary is usually referred to as the “first hand” in a provincial government 
and is ultimately responsible for provincial performance.  
We hand-collect detailed provincial secretary turnover information from the Official 
Records of the Peoples Republic of China (2003) and the officials’ resumes from Xinhua 
(www.xinhuanet.com) or Renmin (www.people.com.cn) websites. We also obtain some 
relevant information through searching for turnover news on Baidu (www.baidu.com).1 Our 
turnover data set covers 31 provincial-level administrative regions, including 22 provinces, 4 
municipalities and 5 autonomous regions.2  
4.2. Baseline model specification 
To examine the impact of turnover on change in bank loans, we use the following 
regression model: 
   0 1loan a a Turnover Control YearDummies IndustryDummiesλ ε∆ = + + + + +∑    （1） 
The dependent variable Δloan is the firm-level change in bank loans (i.e. newly granted 
bank loans), defined as the change in total bank loans in the current year scaled by lagged total 
assets. We measure the changes of bank loans because we intend to explore the differences 
between years that officials rotate and the years they do not. The control variables, including 
                                                             
1 Baidu is the Chinese search engine equivalent to Google. 
2 The two special administrative regions (i.e. Hong Kong and Macao) and Taiwan are not included in our sample, due to the 
significant differences in their political and economic systems.  
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firm performance and characteristics, are defined in Table 1. To support H1, we expect a 
significantly negative 𝑎𝑎1.  
To test H2 on the efficiency of bank loan allocation, we examine the sensitivity between 
Tobin’s Q and newly granted loans in the turnover years by using the following regression 
model: 
0 1 2 3
4 5 6 2
tq a a longl a longl Turnover a Turnover
a Control a year a ind u
∆ = + ∆ + ∆ × +
+ + + +∑ ∑ ∑
          （2） 
The dependent variable is estimated by using Tobin’s Q of the current year minus Tobin’s 
Q of the previous year. Control variables are defined in Table 1. To support H2, we must 
document a significantly positive 𝑎𝑎2.  
[Insert Table 1] 
Table 2 presents the distribution of our sample across years and summary statistics of 
variables. Panel A shows that between 2000 and 2008, 66 provinces experienced provincial 
party secretary turnover, which is 23.66% of all provinces on average, and the firms 
corresponding to turnover provinces is 25.41% of the total sample of the firms. Panel B shows 
that the change in long-term loans (Δlongl) in the turnover group is significantly lower than 
that in the non-turnover group. 
[Insert Table 2] 
5. Empirical Results 
5.1. Test of H1 
Table 3 reports the regression result of Model (1). It shows that the coefficient on official 
turnover (Turnover) is significantly negative with local state-owned firms’ bank loans (Δloan), 
16 
 
meaning that compared with the years in which there is no turnover, the loans of local SOEs 
decline in years when there is turnover, which supports H1a. Further tests focusing on different 
types of loans (i.e. long-term loans and short-term loans) show that turnover negatively 
influences long-term loans (Δlongl), while exerting no significant influence on short-term loans 
(Δshortl). The results imply that in years when officials rotate, a decrease is only seen in long-
term loans. This evidence supports H1b. 
As for control variables, we report that the larger the size of the firm (Size), the larger the 
acquired long-term loans (Δlongl). A possible explanation is that large local SOEs plays a 
bigger role than small firms do in local economic growth, and they are important in keeping 
the local unemployment rate low. Therefore, the local government is more likely to give support 
to those large firms in bank loan allocation. We also find that Tangibility has a significant 
negative impact on total loans (Δloan) and long-term loans (Δlongl). This result suggests that 
firms with more tangible assets tend to rely less on short-term loans, consistent with Fan et al. 
(2008). Our results also show that the profitability of a firm (ROA) is positively associated with 
total loans (Δloan), long-term loans (Δlongl), and short-term loans (Δshortl). This evidence is 
consistent with the static trade-off theory.  
[Insert Table 3] 
5.2. Test of H2 
We then examine how local SOEs’ long-term loans affect their Tobin’s Q when turnover 
happens. Table 4 reports the results of the regression in Model (2). Official turnover (Turnover) 
is not significantly associated with firm value (Δtq). Long-term loans (Δlongl) are significantly 
negatively related with firm value (Δtq), implying that the long-term loans of local SOEs are 
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not efficient and reduce firm value. The coefficient on the interaction of turnover and long-
term loans is significantly positive, showing that in turnover years, the more the long-term loan 
a firm gets, the higher its value grows. This result suggests that, generally, local SOEs’ 
allocation of loan resources is inefficient; yet in turnover years, this inefficiency could be 
reduced, which supports H2.  
As discussed in Section 2, both the supply-side adjustment (i.e. the bank channel) and the 
demand-side adjustment (i.e. the firm channel) during political turnover could potentially affect 
the efficiency of loan allocation. Considering the bank channel, under less political pressure 
during turnover years, banks have more autonomy in credit allocation. Therefore, they are more 
likely to make profit-maximizing lending decisions, and the high-quality loans are more likely 
to increase firm value (Beck et al., 2000). The positive coefficient on the interaction of turnover 
and long-term loans supports this prediction. Considering the firm channel, local officials have 
less of a political incentive to encourage overinvestment during turnover years. The reduced 
political pressure allows local SOEs to increase efficiency by cutting back on inefficient 
investments (i.e. overinvestment), leading to a decline in the demand for long-term loans. The 
greater the decrease in long-term loans (i.e. the greater the decrease in large inefficient 
investments), the greater the improvement in efficiency. This prediction implies a negative 
coefficient on the interaction of turnover and long-term loans. Yet this is not supported by our 
regression results. Our fining suggests that political turnover impacts bank loans mainly 
through the bank channel, or the effect from the bank channel dominates if the effects from 
both channels coexist. 
[Insert Table 4] 
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5.3. The behaviour of lending new loans 
It should be noted that there are many zeros for the value of the change in long-term loans 
(Δlongl), as not all local SOEs receive new loans each year. To ensure that our results are not 
driven by this pattern of data, we conduct a further analysis, focusing on the change in new 
long-term loans. We use three dummy variables to gauge whether a firm receives new long-
term loans: (1) Δduml equals 1 if long-term loans for the current year are greater than long-
term loans for the previous year, and 0 otherwise; (2) Δdumlnew equals 1 if (Long-term loanyear 
t + Long-term loan due within one yearyear t – Long-term loanyear t-1 – Interest payableyear t) is 
greater than 0, and 0 otherwise3; and (3)Δdumlquarter equals 1 if a firm has an increase in 
long-term loans in any quarter, and 0 otherwise. We use quarterly data to construct this variable, 
considering that firms may take out new loans and pay off old loans at different points in time 
within a year. Loan data from annual reports may not capture such changes within a year. 
[Insert Table 5] 
Table 5 reports the descriptive statistics of the three dummy variables for new long-term 
loans and the regression results. Panel A shows that the mean value of the change in the long-
term loans of local SOEs in the turnover group is significantly lower than that in the non-
turnover group. Panel B reports the regression results. We find a significant negative impact of 
official turnover on new long-term loans across all three measures of new long-term loans. We 
also report a significant positive correlation between Δtq and the interaction of turnover and 
new long-term loans, suggesting that find that the efficiency of new long-term loans increases 
                                                             
3We also use quarterly data to construct this variable, and the results are essentially unchanged. 
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in turnover years, consistent with the results in Table 3 and Table 4. 
5.4. Regional differences 
Economic development and market development conditions vary across 
regions/provinces in China. In order to further empirically answer whether provincial official 
turnover impacts on bank loans and improvement in credit allocation efficiency in different 
regions/provinces with various degrees of economic development and marketization, we 
classify firms into Eastern China and Central-and-Western China subsamples4 and high and 
low degrees of marketization subsamples based on the median of the NERI (National Economic 
Research Institute of China) marketization index.  
[Insert Table 6] 
Table 6 reports the results. The impact of turnover on long-term loans of local SOEs and 
on the efficiency of loans in turnover years is only significant in the well-developed eastern 
region. We also find similar results based on the high and low degrees of marketization 
subsamples. The decline in bank loans and improvement in credit allocation efficiency in more 
marketized provinces are more affected by provincial official turnover. Our results are 
consistent with Jones and Olken (2004), who find that national leaders’ turnover has a 
significant effect on economic growth in high-income countries, yet not in low-income 
countries. Both the resource endowment and the degree of marketization are higher in the 
eastern region of China, providing more space for local government officials to exert their 
                                                             
4 The Eastern group includes the following provinces: Peking, Tianjin, Hebei, Liaoning, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, 
Shandong, Guangdong and Hainan; the Middle-and-Western group includes Shanxi, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Anhui, Jiangxi, 
Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Sichuan, Chongqin, Guizhou, Yunnan, Xizang, Shanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, Xinjiang, Guangxi 
and Neimenggu. The Easten provinces are generally more developed than the Middle-and-Western provinces.    
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influence. Officials in high resource endowment areas are more likely to be competitive in 
seeking economic development. Therefore, political officials in the eastern region may have a 
stronger influence on long-term loans, and their intervention could cause more severe 
overinvestment problems. In the absence of political intervention in turnover years, banks in 
the eastern region could have better self-adjusting abilities and issue loans more effectively. 
Our finding supports this prediction. 
5.5. Further Analyses 
An alternative interpretation of our results is that political uncertainty is associated with 
official turnover, which reduces banks’ incentives to issue loans. If this is the case, political 
uncertainty should affect not only local SOEs but also other types of firms. We therefore 
replicate the tests based on data from other types of firms, namely non-SOEs (i.e. private firms) 
and central-SOEs (i.e. SOEs controlled by the central government). The results, untabulated 
but available upon request, show that provincial political turnover does not significantly 
influence bank loans in non-SOEs or central-SOEs. The impact is only significant for local 
SOEs (i.e. SOEs controlled by local governments). Therefore, the evidence suggests that the 
political uncertainty interpretation is not plausible.  Results are available upon request The 
untabulated GMM estimation results for Equations 2 and 3 but are available upon request. 
To further examine whether there is a difference between local SOEs under indirect control 
and those under direct control by provincial governments, we split our sample into two 
subsamples: those controlled by city or county governments and those controlled by provincial 
governments. Although turnover is still negatively associated with the change in loans, the 
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magnitude is higher for the latter, suggesting that provincial party secretary turnover has a 
larger impact on the loans of firms under their direct control. These results are also untabulated 
for the sake of space but available upon request from the authors. 
5.6. Robustness Checks 
The turnover of general secretaries is unlikely to occur randomly, leading to endogeneity 
concerns. For example, a decrease in debt financing can slow down the economy, which is 
likely to lead to the replacement of the general secretaries. We use two instrumental variables 
(IVs) to address the issue, namely the cumulative tenure of the departing official (Accum_term), 
and the number of local post and telecommunication businesses (Post&telec).5 Due to the 
central control of the tenure of Community Party and government officials, the longer the 
tenure, the greater the possibility of being replaced. The number of local post and 
telecommunication businesses, from the Chinese Statistical Yearbook, could well reflect the 
local economic development, which affects local official turnover. Table 7 shows that both IVs 
significantly predict the turnover of provincial top officials in the first stage. The predicted 
turnover is significantly negatively associated with the change in total loans and the change in 
long-term loans in the second stage. 
[Insert Table 7] 
We also use the difference-in-differences (DiD) method as a further robustness check. In 
many provinces, turnover happens more than once, while in some provinces, turnover has never 
happened. For example, in Zhejiang province, the provincial secretary changed in 2003 and 
2007; in Xinjiang province, there has been no turnover. Therefore, we perform three 
                                                             
5 Because “Post&telec” has a significant relation with “GDP”, we drop “GDP” in Model (1) to (4) in Table 7. 
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comparisons: the situation of local SOEs in turnover years and their situation in years before 
turnover, the situation of local SOEs in turnover years and their situation in years after turnover, 
and the situation of local SOEs in turnover years and local SOEs in provinces where no turnover 
has ever happened. Our results in Table 8 show that the relation between official turnover and 
new loans is significantly negative across all three DiD analyses.  
[Insert Table 8] 
6. Conclusion 
This study explores the impact of political turnover on bank loan allocation and efficiency, 
in the context of turnover of Chinese provincial party committee secretaries between 2000 and 
2008. We find an average of an 18.9% decrease in the loan increment of local SOEs in turnover 
years relative to non-turnover years, and the decrease mainly results from the reduction of long-
term loans. We argue that the career-related incentives embedded in Chinese political and 
economic systems could be a plausible explanation for our results. Local officials have less of 
a political incentive to encourage overinvestment and to intervene in bank lending activities 
during turnover years, as the central government has already decided their destination by the 
time the turnover is announced. The results further show that loan efficiency significantly 
improves in turnover years, suggesting that banks could play a more effective financial 
intermediary role in credit allocation when there is less political intervention in turnover years.  
Our novel evidence based on the Chinese setting highlights the importance of considering 
local officials’ career-related political incentives in explaining their influence on local bank 
loan allocation. The results, contrasting those found in countries with democratic elections, 
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also suggest that it is crucial to understand the political regime and economic structure in which 
such career-related political incentives are embedded when studying the impact of a reshuffle 
of local political power on local economic activity. Finally, our results may shed additional 
light on the understanding of political influence in other transitional economies featuring state 
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Table 1 Definitions of Variables 
 
Δloan (total bank loan of current year – total bank loan of previous year)*100/total assets of 
previous year, and taking a value of zero if the calculated value is negative. 
Δlongl (long-term loan of current year – long-term loan of previous year)*100/total assets of 
previous year, and taking a value of zero if the calculated value is negative.  
Δshortl (total short-term bank loan of current year – total short-term bank loan of previous 
year)*100/total assets of previous year, and taking a value of zero if the calculated value 
is negative. 
Δtq Tobin’s Q of current year minus Tobin’s Q of previous year to capture the increment of 
firm value. 
Turnover Dummy variable taking a value of one when a province experiences turnover in year t. 
Size The log of total assets. 
Tangible Tangible assets as a ratio of assets. 
ROA Net earnings as a ratio of assets. 
Growth The percentage change in annual sales. 
GDP Increment of five-year moving average provincial GDP. 
Δduml Dummy variable taking a value of one when long-term loan of the current year minus 
long-term loan of the previous year is positive, and zero otherwise.  
Δdumlnew Dummy variable taking a value of one if the new loan (Long-term loant + Long-term loan 
due within one yeart – Long-term loant-1 – Interest payablet) is greater than zero, and zero 
otherwise. 
Δdumlquarter Dummy variable taking the value of one when the firm has increased long-term loans in 
any of the four quarters, and zero otherwise. 
Post&telec The log of the number of a province’s post and telecommunication businesses. 





Table 2 Sample Distribution and Summary Statistics 
 
Panel A presents the distribution of our sample across years. Panel B reports summary statistics of variables. ***, **, and * in Panel B indicate the two-tailed significance of 
the difference between means or medians between the non-turnover and turnover samples at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Sample distribution by year 
year 
 Province Sample  Local SOE Sample 
 
No. of turnover 
 provinces 
Percent of 
 31 provinces 
 
No. of local SOEs in 
turnover provinces 
Total no. of local SOEs Percent 
2000  4 12.90%  82 500 16.40% 
2001  7 22.58%  89 580 15.34% 
2002  6 19.35%  72 630 11.43% 
2003  12 38.71%  381 674 56.53% 
2004  3 9.68%  38 631 6.02% 
2005  4 12.90%  83 647 12.83% 
2006  7 22.58%  80 603 13.27% 
2007  10 32.26%  206 605 34.05% 
2008  13 41.94%  362 612 59.15% 
Total  66 23.66%  1,393 5,482 25.41% 
Panel B: Summary statistics   
  Δloan Δlongl Δshortl Δtq growth size Tangible ROA ΔROA GDP 
Non- 
turnover 
Mean 5.922 2.568* 4.258 -0.011*** 0.186*** 21.212*** 0.460*** 0.027 -0.004** 10.789*** 
Median 1.386 0.000** 0.824 -0.050*** 0.108*** 21.132*** 0.436*** 0.030 -0.002 10.782*** 
Sd. 9.684 5.941 6.908 0.507 0.636 0.890 0.278 0.062 0.105 1.547 
Turnover 
Mean 5.806 2.241 4.313 -0.115 0.130 21.315 0.373 0.028 0.006 11.328 
Median 1.284 0.000 0.706 -0.110 0.027 21.218 0.341 0.032 -0.001 10.896 
Sd. 10.079 5.627 7.307 0.645 0.513 0.973 0.300 0.066 0.182 1.793 
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Table 3 Impact of Official Turnover on Allocation of Bank Loans 
 
This table presents the results regarding the effect of official turnover on the change in bank loans. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate that the 
coefficient is statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Δloan Δlongl Δshortl Δloan Δlongl Δshortl 
Turnover -0.993* -1.552*** -0.309 -1.122** -1.566*** -0.401 
 (-1.82) (-3.10) (-0.77) (-2.08) (-3.13) (-1.01) 
growth    0.015 0.008 0.004 
    (0.28) (0.15) (0.10) 
size    -0.200 1.557*** -0.277 
    (-0.78) (6.53) (-1.46) 
Tangible    -4.098*** -0.441 -2.691*** 
    (-4.06) (-0.48) (-3.63) 
ROA    42.480*** 18.760*** 27.060*** 
    (11.61) (5.60) (10.27) 
GDP    -0.034 -0.295* 0.155 
    (-0.19) (-1.77) (1.15) 
Ind/year yes yes yes yes yes yes 
_cons 5.848*** -2.248* 4.442*** 9.940* -32.060*** 8.405** 
 (4.01) (-1.72) (4.14) (1.78) (-6.18) (2.04) 
N 5,482 5,482 5,482 5,482 5,482 5,482 





Table 4 Impact of Official Turnover on Efficiency of Bank Loan Allocation 
 
This table presents results regarding the effect of official turnover on the efficiency of bank loan allocation. Heteroscedasticity-consistent t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate that the coefficient is statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Δtq Δtq Δtq Δtq Δtq Δtq Δtq 
Δlongl -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.005*** 
 (-4.37) (-8.21) (-8.18) (-8.08) (-7.59) (-7.56) (-7.60) 
Turnover   0.004 0.001  0.004 0.001 
   (0.39) (0.11)  (0.42) (0.12) 
Turnover *Δlongl    0.003*   0.003** 
    (1.91)   (2.03) 
Growth     -0.051*** -0.051*** -0.051*** 
     (-5.35) (-5.35) (-5.38) 
Size     -0.011** -0.011** -0.011** 
     (-2.26) (-2.26) (-2.24) 
ROA     -0.039 -0.039 -0.039 
     (-1.17) (-1.18) (-1.17) 
GDP     -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
     (-0.85) (-0.87) (-0.88) 
Tangible     0.058** 0.058** 0.056** 
     (2.14) (2.14) (2.08) 
Ind/year no yes yes yes yes yes yes 
_cons -0.016** 0.355*** 0.354*** 0.355*** 0.604*** 0.604*** 0.604*** 
 (-2.39) (12.42) (12.40) (12.43) (5.69) (5.69) (5.69) 
N 5,482 5,482 5,482 5,482 5,482 5,482 5,482 
R2 0.004 0.599 0.599 0.599 0.605 0.605 0.605 




Table 5 Impact of Official Turnover on New Loans 
 
This table presents descriptive statistics and the regression results of new loans. t-statistics are reported in parentheses, and they are adjusted for heteroskedasticity when the 
dependent variable is Δtq. ***, **, and * indicate that the coefficient is statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics of New Loans 
  Δduml Δdumlnew Δdumlquarter 
Non-Turnover 
Mean 0.360* 0.525** 0.588*** 
Median 0.000* 1.000** 1.000*** 
Sd. 0.480 0.499 0.492 
Turnover 
Mean 0.327 0.489 0.551 
Median 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Sd. 0.469 0.500 0.498 
Total Sample 
Mean 0.352 0.516 0.579 
Median 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Sd. 0.477 0.500 0.494 
Panel B: Regression on New Loans 
 X=Δduml  X=Δdumlnew  X=Δdumlquarter 
 （1） （2）  （3） （4）  （5） （6） 
 X Δtq  X Δtq  X Δtq 
Turnover -0.182** -0.009  -0.141** -0.009  -0.122* -0.011 
 (-2.51) (-0.72)  (-2.13) (-0.54)  (-1.75) (-0.74) 
X  -0.048***   -0.031***   -0.027*** 
  (-4.79)   (-3.28)   (-2.63) 
Turnover*X  0.044**   0.036*   0.038** 
  (2.20)   (1.89)   (1.97) 
growth 0.008 -0.056***  0.066 -0.054***  0.005 -0.052*** 
 (0.16) (-5.84)  (1.37) (-3.69)  (0.90) (-5.32) 
size 0.354*** -0.011**  0.543*** -0.012**  0.611*** -0.018*** 
 (8.83) (-2.23)  (10.51) (-2.58)  (11.19) (-3.58) 
         
Tangible 0.014 0.070**  0.541*** 0.075***  0.361* 0.075*** 
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 (0.09) (2.57)  (2.91) (3.34)  (1.95) (2.70) 
ROA 2.570***   -0.377   0.562  
 (4.82)   (-0.71)   (0.97)  
ΔROA  -0.036   -0.036   -0.066** 
  (-1.06)   (-0.21)   (-2.02) 
GDP -0.011 -0.002  -0.012 -0.002  -0.031 -0.002 
 (-0.43) (-0.69)  (-0.41) (-0.76)  (-1.04) (-0.50) 
Ind/year yes yes  yes yes  yes yes 
_cons -7.329*** 0.612***  -10.680*** 0.629***  -11.920*** 0.739*** 
 (-8.56) (5.70)  (-9.86) (6.08)  (-10.16) (6.79) 
N 5,482 5,482  5,482 5,482  5,482 5,482 
R2  0.602   0.604   0.595 





Table 6 Official Turnover Effect in Different Regions 
 
This table presents results for the official turnover effect in different regions. t-statistics are reported in parentheses, and they are adjusted for heteroskedasticity when the 
dependent variable is Δtq. ***, **, and * indicate that the coefficient is statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A Eastern Regions  Middle-and-Western Regions 
 （1） （2）  （3） （4） 
 Δlongl Δtq  Δlongl Δtq 
Turnover -2.085*** 0.008  -0.879 0.010 
 (-2.60) (0.44)  (-1.24) (0.62) 
Δlongl  -0.006***   -0.004*** 
  (-6.06)   (-3.28) 
Turnover*Δlongl  0.003*   0.002 
  (1.81)   (1.20) 
growth 0.009 -0.053***  0.206 -0.046** 
 (0.18) (-3.51)  (0.57) (-1.98) 
size 1.642*** -0.026***  1.915*** -0.009 
 (5.19) (-2.85)  (4.99) (-0.88) 
Tangible -0.691 0.058*  -0.289 0.068 
 (-0.57) (1.72)  (-0.20) (1.56) 
ROA 15.700***   23.080***  
 (3.55)   (4.35)  
ΔROA  -0.484***   0.149 
  (-4.14)   (0.95) 
GDP -0.124 -0.004  0.043 -0.006 
 (-0.45) (-0.62)  (0.17) (-1.01) 
Ind/year yes yes  yes yes 
_cons -34.830*** 0.898***  -42.510*** 0.602*** 
 (-4.64) (4.23)  (-5.19) (2.76) 
N 3,156 3,156  2,326 2,326 
R2  0.588   0.624 






NERI < Median 
 （1） （2）  （3） （4） 
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 Δlongl Δtq  Δlongl Δtq 
Turnover -1.689** -0.005  -0.692 0.013 
 (-2.07) (-0.26)  (-0.99) (1.00) 
Δlongl  -0.005***   -0.005*** 
  (-5.14)   (-6.20) 
Turnover*Δlongl  0.004*   0.002 
  (1.76)   (1.11) 
growth -0.101 -0.057***  0.058 -0.040*** 
 (-0.69) (-4.04)  (0.93) (-3.27) 
size 1.807*** -0.038***  1.341*** 0.022*** 
 (5.53) (-5.41)  (3.79) (3.46) 
Tangible -0.539 -0.002  0.049 0.098*** 
 (-0.41) (-0.05)  (0.04) (2.91) 
ROA 17.874***   20.320***  
 (3.79)   (4.19)  
ΔROA  0.213***   -0.382*** 
  (4.45)   (-8.45) 
GDP -0.573** -0.007  0.319 -0.002 
 (-2.13) (-1.14)  (1.33) (-0.50) 
Ind/year -34.335*** 1.198***  -36.094*** -1.105*** 
_cons (-4.61) (7.35)  (-4.46) (-7.43) 
 yes yes  yes yes 
N 2,813 2,813  2,669 2,669 
R2  - 0.637    0.551 






Table 7 2SLS Regression Results 
 
This table presents results of 2SLS regression. The IV in Panel A is the log of the number of province’s post and telecommunication businesses (Post&telec), and the IV in 
Panel B is cumulative tenure of departed officials (Accum_term). t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate that the coefficient is statistically significant at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 Panel A: IV=Post&telec  Panel B: IV= Accum_term 
 First-stage  Second-stage  First-stage  Second-stage 
 (1)  (2) (3) (4)  (5)  (6) (7) (8) 
 Turnover  Δloan Δlongl Δshortl  Turnover  Δloan Δlongl Δshortl 
Turnover   -21.160** -14.530** -7.455    -6.748** -3.945** -2.638 
   (-2.27) (-2.47) (-1.34)    (-2.05) (-2.01) (-1.13) 
Post&telec 0.166***           
 (3.46)           
Accum_term       0.089***     
       (7.64)     
growth -0.006  0.001 -0.005 -0.004  -0.006  0.007 0.000 -0.003 
 (-0.46)  (0.01) (-0.19) (-0.15)  (-0.42)  (0.20) (0.01) (-0.11) 
size 0.001  -0.444** 0.169 -0.428***  -0.026  -0.477*** 0.163* -0.455*** 
 (0.02)  (-2.18) (1.31) (-3.50)  (-0.63)  (-2.96) (1.70) (-4.00) 
Tangible -0.142  -2.070*** -0.294 -1.536***  -0.025  -1.869*** -0.188 -1.433*** 
 (-0.85)  (-2.58) (-0.58) (-3.20)  (-0.15)  (-2.97) (-0.50) (-3.23) 
ROA -0.014  13.510*** 4.247*** 9.340***  0.019  13.550*** 4.271*** 9.352*** 
 (-0.04)  (6.52) (3.24) (7.53)  (0.05)  (8.27) (4.38) (8.08) 
GDP       0.091***  0.011 -0.123* 0.119 
       (2.98)  (0.09) (-1.67) (1.36) 
Ind/year yes  yes yes yes  yes  yes yes yes 
_cons -3.115***  19.180*** 0.105 16.110***  -3.334***  18.730*** 0.711 15.140*** 
 (-3.46)  (4.42) (0.04) (6.21)  (-3.63)  (5.31) (0.34) (6.07) 
N 5,482  5,482 5,482 5,482  5,482  5,482 5,482 5,482 




Table 8 Difference-in-Differences Results 
 
This table presents results of difference-in-differences regressions. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, 
and * indicate that the coefficient is statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 Year of Turnover vs. 
 Year before Turnover 
Year of Turnover vs. 
Year after Turnover 
Year of Turnover vs 
Turnover never happens 
 Δlongl Δlongl Δlongl 
Turnover -0.932* -1.646** -2.838* 
 (-1.66) (-2.48) (-1.71) 
growth 0.010 -0.065 0.163 
 (0.20) (-0.47) (0.88) 
size 1.159*** 1.825*** 1.504*** 
 (4.53) (6.28) (3.41) 
Tangible -0.571 0.379 1.203 
 (-0.58) (0.33) (0.63) 
ROA 18.840*** 13.890*** 12.380** 
 (5.35) (3.41) (2.30) 
GDP -0.156 -0.424* -0.181 
 (-0.81) (-1.87) (-0.45) 
Ind/year yes yes yes 
_cons -26.190*** -37.800*** -29.430*** 
 (-4.58) (-5.48) (-3.01) 
N 4,705 3,219 1,522 
Chi2 266.6 267.8 95.54 
 
 
